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Although the equity premium is - both from a conceptual and empirical perspective - a widely
researched topic in ﬁnance, there is still no consensus in the academic literature about its magni-
tude. In this paper, we propose a diﬀerent estimation method which is based on credit valuations.
The main idea is straigtforward: We use structural models to link equity valuations to credit
valuations. Based on a simple Merton model, we derive an estimator for the market Sharpe
ratio. This estimator has several advantages. First, it oﬀers a new line of thought for estimating
the equity premium which is not directly linked to current methods. Second, it is only based
on observable parameters. We do neither have to calibrate dividend or earnings growth - which
is usually necessary in dividend/earnings discount models - nor do we have to calibrate asset
values or default barriers - which is usually necessary in traditional applications of structural
models. Third, it is robust to model changes. We examine the model of Duﬃe/Lando (2001) -
which is one of the most sophisticated structural models currently discussed in the literature -
to show this robustness.
In an empirical analysis we have used CDS spreads of the 125 most liquid CDS in the U.S. from
2003 to 2007 to estimate the equity premium. We derive an average implicit market Sharpe ratio
of appr. 40%. Adjusting for taxes and other parts of the credit spread not attributable to credit
risk yields an average market Sharpe ratio below 30%. This conﬁrms research on the equity
premium, which indicates that the historically observed Sharpe ratio of 40-50% - correspond-
ing to an equity premium of 7-9% and a volatility of 15-20% - was partly due to one-time eﬀects.
In addition, our research can be used to explain empirical ﬁndings about credit risk premia,
which are usually measured as the ratio of risk-neutral to actual default probabilities. We show
that the behavior of these ratios can be directly inferred from a simple Merton model and that
this behavior is robust to model changes.
Keywords: equity premium, credit risk premium, credit risk, structural models of default1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Risk premia in equity markets are a widely researched topic. The risk premium in equity markets
is usually deﬁned as the equity premium, e.g. the excess return of equities over risk free bonds.
The literature discusses three diﬀerent ways for the measurement of the equity premium: Models
based on historical realizations, discounted cash-ﬂow models and models based on utility functions.
While historical averages have long dominated theory and practical applications, current research
suggests an upward bias, e.g. the ex post realized equity returns do not correctly mirror the ex
ante priced equity premium.1 In the U.S., historical averages have been around 7-9% depending
on the time horizon and methodology (arithmetic/geometric) used.2 Discounted cash-ﬂow models
have become more popular recently, but are also subject to debate, in particular for their rather
high sensitivity to forecasts with respect to dividend- or earnings growth rates. Estimations based
on such models yield implied equity premia in the range from 3%-5%.3 Although approaches based
on utility functions have been subject to intensive debate in the academic literature4, its use in
practical applications is currently of minor importance.
The risk aversion of investors inﬂuences credit prices and returns as well. As an example, we
have looked at CDS contracts of A-rated obligors in the CDS-index CDX.NA.IG from 2003-2007.
The average 5-year CDS spread has been 37 bp, whereas the average annual expected loss is less
than 10 bp. Therefore, these 5-year CDS investments yield an average return of appr. 28 bp above
the risk free rate, as can be seen from table 1. In absolute terms, this premium increases with
decreasing credit quality (i.e. the expected net returns increase with increasing ’riskyness’). Mea-
sured relative to the expected loss (or the actual default probability) it decreases with declining
credit quality. Over the last years, research about this default risk premium has developed, but
there has not yet emerged consensus on the methodology for measuring this default premia.5
We use structural models of default to convert credit spreads into an equity premium. Speci-
fying a speciﬁc structural model, one can derive the risk neutral and the actual default probability.
Used the other way around, the diﬀerence between risk neutral and actual default probability yields
the dynamics of the asset value process, in particular the asset Sharpe ratio. Together with the
asset correlation, we are then able to derive the market Sharpe ratio.
The estimator for the market Sharpe ratio derived in this paper has three important charac-
teristics, which make it very convenient for our purpose. First, it is only based on observable
parameters, i.e. risk neutral and actual default probabilities, the maturity and the equity correla-
tion. The risk neutral default probability and the maturity can be derived from bond prices or CDS
1Among other things, this can be explained by survivorship bias, risk premium volatility, enhanced diversiﬁcation
possibilities, interest rate level and state of the economy; cf. for example Claus/Thomas (2001), Illmanen (2003),
Fama/French (2002).
2Cf. for example Claus/Thomas (2001) and Fama/French (2002) for a discussion and Ibbotson (2006) for historical
data.
3Cf. for example Claus/Thomas (2001), Fama/French (2002) and Illmanen (2002) for an overview.
4This debate is mainly based on the so called ’Equity Premium Puzzle’ put forward by Mehra/Prescott (1985).
Cf. Mehra (2003) for an overview about diﬀerent utility based approaches including alternative preference structures,
disaster states, survivorship bias and borrowing constraints.
5Cf. for example Berndt et.al. (2005) and Hull et.al. (2005) for a discussion.1 INTRODUCTION 2
Rating grade Average 5-y-CDS-mid (bp) Average 5-y-EL p.a. (bp) ∆ (bp) Q-to-P
AA 31.53 5.23 26.30 6.03
A 37.37 9.17 28.20 4.07
Baa1 48.43 14.60 33.83 3.32
Baa2 56.91 22.00 34.91 2.59
Baa3 68.51 33.17 35.34 2.07
Table 1: Credit risk premia for 5-year CDS (Index CDX.NA.IG). ∆(bp): Diﬀerence in bp between
5-year-CDS spread and 5-year-EL p.a. Q-to-P: ratio of CDS spread to EL p.a., equals the ratio of
risk neutral to actual default probabilities.
spreads, the actual default probability from ratings6 and the correlation from equity prices. Unlike
other applications of structural models, we do neither have to calibrate the asset value process nor
the default barrier. Second, the estimator is robust with respect to model changes. We examine a
classical ﬁrst passage time model and the Duﬃe/Lando (2001) model, which incorporates strategic
default and unobservable asset values. By introducing an adjustment factor capturing the diﬀerence
between the Sharpe ratio estimation in the Merton model and the Sharpe ratio estimation in the
Duﬃe/Lando (2001) model, we show that the adjustment factor is close to one for all investment
grade obligors. Third, the estimator is robust with respect to noise in the input parameters. As
an illustration, we look at a model-based 5-year spread of a BBB-rated obligor. This credit spread
is 73 bp for a company Sharpe ratio of 10%, it is 280 bp for a company Sharpe ratio of 40% (cf.
subsection 2.1 for a detailled analysis). This diﬀerence indicates that the common noise in the
data7 will not signiﬁcantly reduce the possibility to extract the Sharpe ratio out of credit spreads.
Mathematically, the sensitivity of the model-based credit spread with respect to the Sharpe ratio
is ’high’ compared to other noise in the data.
We have applied our Sharpe ratio estimator to all NYSE-listed companies in the investment grade
CDS index CDX-NA.IG from 2003 to 2007. The risk neutral default probability was derived from
CDS spreads, EDFs (expected default frequencies) from KMV were used as a proxy for the actual
default probability. We estimated the implied market Sharpe ratio to be about 42% and the com-
pany Sharpe ratio to be about 20%. Adjusting for tax eﬀects results in a market Sharpe ratio of
32% and a company Sharpe ratio of 16%. Using Moody’s ratings instead of EDFs shows similar
results, i.e. a market Sharpe ratio of 39% before and 29% after tax adjustments. This corresponds
to an equity premium of 4.5% - 6%8 and therefore conﬁrms former research, that the historical
equity premium is upward biased. We also show, that for higher rating grades, only 50-70% of the
CDS spreads can be explained by credit risk.9 Reducing the CDS spreads by the amount not due
to credit risk results in even lower equity premium estimates.
6We use EDFs (expected default frequencies) from Moody’s KMV and Moody’s ratings.
7E.g. bid-ask spreads, liquidity eﬀects and inaccuracies in determining the actual default probability.
8Assuming a market volatility of 15-20%.
9This is partly in contrast to research by other authors. Huang/Huang (2005) analyzes bonds and comes to
the conclusion, that for Aa (A) rated obligors only 9 % (10%) of the spread can be explained by credit risk. The
diﬀerence to our analysis is due to three eﬀects. First, we only use the most liquid CDS in the U.S. market, which
should decrease the part of the spread attributable to liquidity. Second, the CDS spreads observed in our sample are
consistently lower than the bond spreads observed by Huang/Huang (2005). We observe average 5-year CDS spreads
of 26/34/50 (Aa/A/Baa) compared to 4-year bond spreads of 65/96/158 by Huang. Third, we use a model with
unobservable asset values which increases theoretical credit spreads especially for high rated obligors.2 MODEL SETUP 3
In addition, our method allows for an extraction of the market’s risk attitude over time. We
ﬁnd, that the implicit Sharpe ratio predominantly varied between 30% and 50% (before adjusting
for tax eﬀects) from 2003-2007 with peaks in 2005 and mid 2007.10
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical frame-
work for credit risk premia based on asset value models including a discussion of the impact of
diﬀerent asset models on the widely used ratio of risk neutral to actual default probabilities (’Q-to-
P-ratios’). We examine a classical Merton model, a ﬁrst passage time model and a model based on
unobservable asset values as proposed by Duﬃe/Lando (2001). In our perspective, using a model
with unobservable asset values is crucial, since only these models are able to explain credit spreads
observed in the markets and yield a default intensity, which constitutes the basis of modern credit
pricing models. Section 3 describes our data and contains a discussion of our empirical results.
Section 4 draws a conclusion.
2 Model setup
This section discusses the theoretical framework for extracting risk premia from CDS spreads. The
basic idea is to use structural asset models to derive a relationship between risk neutral and actual
default probability. Empirically, most structural models perform poorly.11 One of the main reasons
is the calibration process usually needed to speciﬁy structural models, e.g. determination of lever-
age, asset volatilities etc. In contrast to mainstream literature12, we do however not aim to derive
actual and risk neutral default probabilities from structural models. We are simply interested in
the relation between risk neutral and actual default probabilities. Hence, we simply assume, that
there exists a structural model yielding the correct actual default probability and from there derive
the risk neutral default probability. It is therefore not necessary to perform the calibration process
that is usually needed.
Subsection (2.1) starts with the classical Merton model. We derive a simple Merton estimator
for the market Sharpe ratio. This estimator is only based on observable parameters, i.e. the risk
neutral and actual default probability, the maturity and equity correlations. Subsection (2.2) ex-
pands the framework to a simple ﬁrst passage time model. The results do not materially diﬀer
from to the simple Merton framework as long as the asset volatility is above 10%. Asset volatilities
below 10% are generally only observed for ﬁnancial services companies. Subsection (2.3) expands
the approach to the Duﬃe/Lando (2001) model and conﬁrms the results derived in the simple
Merton model for all investment grade companies.
10Some authors analyze the risk aversion based on the ratio of risk neutral to actual default probabilities. Since
these ratios are also largely driven by development of the average rating grade in the sample, we think that the results
do not mirror the risk attitude correctly.
11Cf. Sch¨ onbucher (2003) for an overview.
12Huang/Huang (2005), Bohn (2000) and Delianedis/Geske (1998) use a similar approach. Our approach diﬀers
though in at last three ways: First, we explicitly focus on models with information uncertainty; second, we use CDS
spreads, which should be less sensitive to liquidity distortions; third, we are - to our best knowledge - the ﬁrst who
directly aim to extract the risk attitude out of credit prices via a Sharpe ratio estimation.2 MODEL SETUP 4
2.1 Sharpe ratio estimation in the Merton framework
In this subsection we derive an estimator for the Sharpe ratio based on a simple Merton model.
This estimator is based on the actual and risk neutral default probability, the maturity and the
equity correlation of the respective company. Although based on a structural model, we can omit
the calibration process usually needed for structural models (e.g. default barrier, asset volatility).
In contrast to dividend-/cash-ﬂow discount models, we do not have to calibrate earnings/dividends
and their respective growth rates.
Structural models for the valuation of debt and the determination of default probabilities are
already mentioned in Black/Scholes (1973). The Merton framework presented in this subsection
is based on Merton (1974), who explicitely focusses on the pricing of corporate debt. In this
framework a company’s debt simply consists of one zero-bond. Default occurs if the asset value
of the company falls below the nominal value of the zero bond at the maturity of the bond. A
company can therefore only default at one point in time, which obviously poses a simpliﬁcation of
the real world. The assets Vt are modelled as a geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ and
drift µ = µV (actual drift) and r (risk neutral drift) respectively, i.e. dV P
t = µVtdt + σVtdBt and
dV
Q
t = µVtdt + σVtdBt, where Bs denotes a standard Wiener process. In this framework, the real
world default probability Pdef(t,T) between t and T can be calculated as follows:
Pdef(t,T) = P[ VT < N ] = P[ Vt · e (µ− 1
2σ2)·(T−t)+σ·(BT−Bt) < N ]
= P
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The default probability under the risk neutral measure Q can be determined accordingly as
Qdef(t,T) = Q[ VT < N ] = Φ
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where SRV denotes the Sharpe ratio of the companies assets.
Relationship (4) is a central formula in our paper. It has two main advantages that make it
convenient for our purpose: First, it directly yields the Sharpe ratio of the assets, i.e. neither
µV and σV nor Vt, N or r have to be estimated separately. In contrast to other applications of
structural models we do therefore not have to calibrate any parameter of the asset value process.
13Cf. for example Duﬃe/Singleton (2003).2 MODEL SETUP 5
The company Sharpe ratio can simply be estimated based on actual and risk neutral default prob-
abilities and the maturity. Second, it is quite robust to model changes. This will be discussed in
the next subsections. A graphical illustration of the relationship between risk neutral and actual
default probabilities, Sharpe ratio and maturity is given in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1: Illustration of the relationship between actual and risk neutral default probabilities in the
Merton framework. PDdef: actual cumulative default probability, Qdef: risk neutral cumulative
default probability, SRV : Sharpe ratio of the assets, T: maturity.
If we try to extract the market Sharpe ratio out of (4), we are faced with an additional problem:
The Sharpe ratio of the assets
µV −r
σV will usually diﬀer from the market Sharpe ratio, since the
assets Vt will not necessarily be on the eﬃcient frontier. The Sharpe ratio of the assets does not
only capture the risk preference of investors, but also depends on the correlation of the assets with
the market portfolio. The market Sharpe ratio can be calculated via a straight forward application
of the CAPM:14
µV = r +
µM − r
σM










where ρV,M denotes the correlation coeﬃcient between the asset returns and the market returns.
Therefore, in addition to the Sharpe ratio of the assets, we will need an estimate of the corre-
lation between the asset value and the market portfolio. At ﬁrst, this correlation (ρV,M) seems
to be a problem for practical applications, since it can neither be directly measured nor implic-
itly inferred, e.g. from option prices. However, the correlation ρV,M can be approximated by the
14We assume ρV,M 6= 0.2 MODEL SETUP 6
correlation between the corresponding equity return and the market return (denotet by ρE,M), i.e.
by
ρV,M ≈ ρE,M.
The error of this approximation is negligible, since - within the Merton framework - the equity value
of a company equals a deep-in-the-money call option on the assets.15 For reasonable parameter
choices, the approximation error is less than 3% (for rating grades above B) and 1% (for investment





















Please note, that we will need a suﬃcient sensitivity of the risk neutral default probability Qdef(t,T)
with respect to the Sharpe ratio for an empirical application. Otherwise noise in the data (e.g.
bid-ask-spreads, inaccuracies in determining correlations and actual default probailities) will result
in a very inaccurate estimation. That this sensitivity is large enough can be seen from the ﬁrst











If we look, for example, at a BBB-rated obligor with a 5-year cumulative actual default probability
of appr. 2.17%, the resulting model-based risk neutral default probability should be either 3.6%
(for an asset Sharpe ratio of 10%) or 13% (for an asset Sharpe ratio of 40%) respectively (based
on (3)). Assuming a recovery rate (RR) of 50% transforms this into a CDS spread of either 73
bp or 279 bp (cf. ﬁgure 2 for an illustration).16 This large diﬀerence indicates that noise in the
input parameters will only have a minor eﬀect on our Sharpe ratio estimation. The sensitivity with
respect to noise in diﬀerent input parameters is analyzed in more detail in section 3.
Although we have found a compelling result for an estimation of the market Sharpe ratio, the
assumptions made under the Merton framework are subject to critisism.17 Therefore, we will relax
the assumption about the default timing (cf. subsection 2.2) and the assumption about complete
information (cf. subsection 2.3) in the following subsections by looking at more appropriate ﬁrst
passage time models.
Nevertheless, our estimator for the market Sharpe ratio contains a certain kind of robustness
15The option is deep-in-the-money, since annual default probabilities are less than 0.4% for investment grade
companies and less than 10% for all obligors rated B and above. For deep-in-the-money options, gamma is appr.
zero, i.e. we have an almost aﬃne linear relationship between asset and equity value, cf. Hull (2005) for example.
16Here we are using the approximation CDS-spread = λ
Q· (1-RR). The risk neutral default intensity λ
Q is derived
from the risk neutral cumulative default probability via the relationship Q
def(t,T) = 1 − e
−λQ·(T−t).
17Cf. Duﬃe/Lando (2001) and Sch¨ onbucher (2003) for an overview.2 MODEL SETUP 7
Figure 2: Inﬂuence of the Sharpe ratio on the CDS spread in a Merton framework for diﬀerent
rating categories. Other Parameters: T=5.
against changes in the underlying assumptions: Since both default probabilities (Pdef and Qdef)
are measured within the same model and substracted from each other, the eﬀect of changes in the
default modelling is - qualitatively spoken - reduced signiﬁcantly.
2.2 Sharpe ratio estimation in a ﬁrst passage time framework with obvservable
asset values
Within the Merton framework, default can only occur at the maturity of the bond. This deﬁnitely
poses a simpliﬁcation of the real world. Therefore, we will analyze a ﬁrst passage time framework
in this subsection. In this framework default can also occur before maturity. We will show, that -
although actual and risk neutral default probabilities are quite diﬀerent from the Merton framework
- our estimator for the Sharpe ratio is still accurate as long as the asset volatility is larger than 10%.
In ﬁrst passage time models a default occurs as soon as the asset value falls below a certain
barrier.18 The asset value and the default barrier can both be either observable or unobservable.
This subsection treats a model with a certain default barrier and observable asset values. A model
with a certain default barrier and unobservable asset values based on Duﬃe/Lando (2001) is ana-
lyzed in the next subsection.
As in the Merton framework, asset values Vt are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian mo-
tion, default is modelled as the stopping time τ := inf{s > t;Vs ≤ L}, where L ∈ R denotes
the default threshold. In this framework, the cumulative real world default probability Pdef(t,T)
18Some authors use an even more general version of an ability-to-pay process, cf. Bluhm/Overbeck/Wagner (2003)
for example.2 MODEL SETUP 8
between t and T can be calculated as19
Pdef(t,T) = 1 − P[ min
t≤s≤T
Vs ≥ L] = Φ
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The default probability under the risk neutral measure Q can be calculated accordingly as
Qdef(t,T) = Φ
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We now test the robustness of the simple Merton estimator for the Sharpe ratio and therefore











· AFFP = γMerton · AFFP, (10)
i.e. the adjustment factor shows, how far the estimate of the market Sharpe ratio via the standard
Merton model deviates from the true market Sharpe ratio if a ﬁrst passage model applies. Again, we
have assumed that ρV,M = ρE,M, i.e. that the correlation between market and asset returns equals
the correlation between market and equity returns. This equation holds for reasonable parame-
ter choices in the ﬁrst passage time framework as well, as we will be showing in the next subsection.
The adjustment factor is dependent on the volatility, the Sharpe ratio and the credit quality
(interpreted as actual default probability) of the company. We have numerically determined the
adjustment factor in four steps: First, a combination of asset volatility, company Sharpe ratio,
maturity and rating grade was choosen. We used r=5% as risk-free rate. Then, the ratio of asset
value to default barrier (Vt/L) was determined based on (8) as to yield the cumulative actual de-
fault probability of the rating grade choosen in the ﬁrst step. Given Vt/L and the parameters set
in the ﬁrst step, the risk neutral default probability was determined via (9). In the fourth step, the
actual and risk neutral default probability were plugged into the Sharpe ratio estimator and the
diﬀerence to the Sharpe ratio set in the ﬁrst step was determined. These four steps were repeated
for all reasonable parameter choices. Details about the result can be found in Appendix B (table
7) and in the next subsection. Figure 3 plots the adjustment factor for a Sharpe ratio of 20% and
a maturity of 5 years. The general shape is however also representative for other Sharpe ratios.
The adjustment factor increases with decreasing credit quality and with increasing volatility, but
for investment-grade titles and a volatility smaller than 10% the adjustment factor is close to 1.20
19Cf. Musiala/Rutkowski (1997).
20The boundary of 10% is of course dependent on the required accuracy. With a company Sharpe ratio of 20%,
the adjustment factor equals 1.18 for an asset volatility of 10%, it is already 1.29 for an asset volatility of 7.5%. We
will discuss this issue in a more general setting in the next subsection.2 MODEL SETUP 9
Asset volatilities below 10% usually only occur for ﬁnancial-services companies, so this poses only
a minor restriction.21
Figure 3: ’Credit quality smile’: Adjustment factor in the ﬁrst passage time framework for diﬀerent
asset volatilities. Parameters: r=5%, SRA = 20%, maturity=5. Please note that the majority of
traded bonds and CDS (by volume) has an investment grade rating.
The dependency on the asset volatility can be explained by the default timing: Fixing the cu-
mulative default probability until time T, defaults will occur with a higher probability at the
beginning of the period if the volatility is low.22 Since the diﬀerence between the risk neutral and
the actual default probability increases with increasing maturity in the Merton model (cf. (3)),
a large diﬀerence between the risk neutral and actual default probability can therefore only be
explained by a large Sharpe ratio.23
We have shown in this subsection, that the Merton estimator for the Sharpe ratio derived in
subsection 2.1 is still accurate in a ﬁrst passage time framework as long as the asset volatility is
larger than 10%. Asset volatilities below 10% are only reasonable for ﬁnancial services companies,
21In our sample of 125 companies of the CDS index CDX.NA.IG appr. 90% of all non-ﬁnancial companies had an
asset volatility of 10% or larger based on data from Moody’s KMV. In contrast, for ﬁnancial services companies, the
volatility is 10% or smaller in appr. 75% of all cases.
22I.e. the conditional expected default time E [ τ | τ < T ] conditional on default until T is lower for lower asset
volatilities if we only compare stopping times τ with P[τ < T] = c. Please note that - all other parameters being
equal - the default probability declines with declining asset volatility. Therefore, the expected value of the default
time will also decrease. In this case, comparing only stopping times with a ﬁxed cumulative default probability simply
means, that the declining asset volatility is always balanced by a lower t0-asset-value.
23A possible way to increase the accuracy of our estimation could be a substitution of the maturity by the expected
default time conditional on default up to time T. This expected default time could be derived from the cumulative
default probabilities for each rating grade, see table 11 in Appendix D.2 MODEL SETUP 10
so the Merton estimator is still accurate for all non-ﬁnancial services companies. Although actual
and risk neutral default probabilities both diﬀer from the Merton model, the diﬀerence between
(the inverse cumulative normal distribution of the) actual and risk neutral default probability is
merely aﬀected.
2.3 Sharpe ratio estimation in a ﬁrst passage time framework with unobvservable
asset values
Credit spreads predicted by simple ﬁrst passage time models are not able to fully predict the credit
spreads that can be observed on the markets.24 In particular, for short term maturities market
credit spreads (or risk neutral default probabilities respectively) are higher than a simple ﬁrst pas-
sage time model would suggest.
In this subsection, we analyze a model - proposed by Duﬃe/Lando (2001) - which is able to
explain the credit spreads observed in the markets. We show, that the simple Merton estimator
is still accurate in this setting for all investment grade entities. First, we will explain the reasons
for choosing the Duﬃe/Lando framework. Then we will analyze the robustness of the Merton
estimator in this setting.
Higher credit spreads for short term maturitites seem to be mainly attributable to credit risk
and are unlikely to be mainly due to liquidity eﬀects, other risk factors or market imperfections.25
This justiﬁes the explanation of these higher credit spreads within credit risk models. Most impor-
tantly, the literature points out that asset values may be unobservable due to imperfect information
structures.26 Therefore, the current asset value becomes a random variable, which in turn has the
eﬀect of increasing short term default probabilities. A model with unobservable asset values has
been developed by Duﬃe/Lando (2001). In addition, the default barrier may be unobservable itself.
This is consistent with the fact that the recovery rate is usually assumed to be a random variable
rather than a ﬁxed value.27 An unobservable default barrier leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the
short term default probability. Long term default probabilities are, however, less aﬀected, since
the asset volatility dominates uncertainty for longer time periods. A model with an unobservable
default barrier has been implemented by Finger et.al. (2002) within the commercial model Cred-
itGrades. Finally, asset values may not be lognormally distributed and may incorporate jumps.
This increases the short term probability, that the asset value will fall below the default barrier.28
A model with jumps in the asset value process has been analyzed by Zhou (1997).
In this subsection, we will focus on the model of Duﬃe/Lando (2001). We choose the Duﬃe/Lando
model for our analysis as it is the only structural model consistent with reduced form credit
pricing. Reduced form credit pricing is currently the major approach for pricing credit deriva-
24Cf. Duﬃe/Lando (2001), Duﬃe/Singleton (2003) and Sch¨ onbucher (2003) for a detailed discussion.
25Cf. for example Sch¨ onbucher (2003).
26Cf. Duﬃe/Lando (2001).
27Cf. for example Moody’s (2007). A random recovery rate could though also be induced by introducing random
insolvency costs, i.e. costs incurred at default due to direct insolvency expenses, losses in asset value due to a forced
sale in an insolvency process and revaluation of assets serving a speciﬁc purpose for the respective company.
28Note that for long term maturities, a higher volatility has the same eﬀect as adding jumps to the process.
Therefore long term default probabilities will not be aﬀected in the same manner than short term default probabilities.2 MODEL SETUP 11
tives.29 Reduced form pricing models use default intensity processes to derive credit spreads. The
Duﬃe/Lando model is the only structural model so far that yields a default intensity.30 In addition,
the Duﬃe/Lando model incorporates a sophisticated structural model of default (i.e. a strategic
setting of the default barrier based on the asset value process, tax shield and insolvency costs) and
- given an appropriate calibration - results in realistic default intensities for short and long term
maturities.
We will show that - although the default probabilities implied by this model diﬀer substantially
from the classical Merton model - the diﬀerence between risk neutral and actual default probabili-
ties is almost the same as in the Merton model as long as the asset volatility is above 10%. We are
then able to show that the simple Merton estimator for the market Sharpe ratio (6) is accurate in
the Duﬃe/Lando-framework for investment grade companies and asset volatilities above 10%.
In the Duﬃe/Lando framework the asset value is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion with
initial value z0 := ln(V0), volatility σ and drift mP := µ − δ (actual drift) and mQ := r − δ (risk
neutral drift) respectively, where δ denotes the constant payout rate. Like in the classical ﬁrst
passage time framework, default is modelled as the stopping time τ := inf{s > t;Vs ≤ L}, where
L ∈ R denotes the default threshold. In contrast to the classical ﬁrst passage time framework,
investors are not able to observe the asset process directly. Instead they receive imperfect infor-




= ln(Vti) + αUti at the times ti,1 ≤ i ≤ n, where U(ti) is normally
distributed and independent of Bti and α is a parameter specifying the degree of noise in the in-
formation received by the bond/CDS investors. Therefore, the information ﬁltration given to the
bond/CDS investors is31 Ht = σ ({Y (ti),...,Y (Tn),1τ≤s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}). As in Duﬃe/Lando, we will
focus on the case, where investors receives simply one noisy information about the asset value.
Under these assumptions the conditional density g(x|Yt,z0,t) of the asset value Vt conditional on
the noisy information Yti and survival up to time t can be explicitly calculated (cf. Duﬃe/Lando
(2001) for details).
The calculation of the cumulative default probabilities requires a weighted application of (8) over
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FP (t,T,x) denotes the probability that an asset value process starting in t at Vt = x will
fall below the default barrier up to time T (cf. (8)) and g is the conditional density of the asset
value at t given the ﬁltration Ht. Formula (11) can be used to calculate both the actual and the
29Cf. Sch¨ onbucher (2003).
30Defaults in a Merton framework cannot be described by default intensity processes, since the probability of a
default from t (today) until t + δt is always zero or one for a suﬃcient small δt. A default intensity does also not
exist in the Zhou (1997) framework, since the default time cannot be represented by a totally inaccessible stopping
time (which is a consequence of the fact, that the default barrier may be hit/crossed by the normal diﬀusion process
with positive probability) (cf. Duﬃe/Lando (2001) for details).
31Of course, all investors can obvserve whether a default has already occured.
32Of course the probability of a single value Vt will be zero for non-degenerated parameter choices, since we operate
in a continuous setting. We will still use this informal notation to allow for a better understanding.2 MODEL SETUP 12
risk neutral default probability.
As in subsection 2.2, we now test the robustness of the Merton model estimator, i.e. we again
deﬁne an adjustment factor AFDL by
µM − r
σM
= γMerton · AFDL. (12)
This adjustment factor may depend on all parameters included in the model, which we will group
into two diﬀerent classes: Class 1 captures all parameters that can easily be observed in the mar-
ket, i.e. the actual default probability (which is actually a combined parameter of all other input
parameters) and the maturity. Class 2 captures all parameters that cannot be easily observed in
the market, i.e. the asset volatility σ, the payout rate δ or the risk neutral net asset growth rate
m := r − δ, the starting point of the asset value process in t = 0 (Z0), the default barrier L, the
noisy asset value observed at t (b Vt) and the accounting noise α. If the adjustment factor depends
on any class-2-parameter, this will aﬀect our ability to correctly measure the market Sharpe ratio,
since these parameters will possibly be subject to signiﬁcant calibration errors.
We have evaluated (12) for all reasonable combinations of input parameters.33 The calculation
was carried out in four steps: In the ﬁrst step, a combination of a speciﬁc rating grade and all
parameters from the Duﬃe/Lando framework excluding the asset value Vt was choosen. Please
note, that this also involves the speciﬁcation of the asset Sharpe ratio in order to determine the
real world drift of the asset value process. Then, based on (11), the asset value Vt was numerically
determined as to result in the cumulative actual default probability for the respective rating cate-
gory. Given the asset value Vt and the other parameters choosen in the ﬁrst step, a straight forward
application of (11) based on risk neutral parameters was used to determine the risk neutral default
probability. In the fourth step, the Merton estimator was calcualted based on these model-based
actual and risk neutral default probabilities. Comparison with the Sharpe ratio speciﬁed in step
1 yields the adjustment factor. These four steps were repeated for all reasonable parameter com-
binations. Detailed results can be found in Appendix Appendix B. The minimum and maximum
adjustment factor of all parameter combinations are also plottet in ﬁgure 4 as a function of the
rating grade.
The main results can be summarized as follows: First, the adjustment factor is close to 1 for
all parameter combinations as long as the asset volatility is below 10%34 and the resulting actual
33Input parameters used were: σ : 3% − 30% (the 5% and 95% quantile for the asset volatility from KMV was 6%
and 25% respectively), Sharpe ratio of the ability-to-pay process: 10% to 40% (The market Sharpe ratio is usually
assumed to be anywhere between 20% and 50%, due to a correlation of lower than 1, the asset Sharpe ratio should be
smaller), m : 0%−5% (m < 0 would imply, that the payout rate is larger than the risk free rate, m=5% was choosen
as an upper limit to reﬂect (almost) zero payout at a risk free interest rate of 5%.), α : 0% − 30% (α = 0% reﬂects
the classical ﬁrst passage model with observable asset values, Duﬃe/Lando use 10% as a standard value, the upper
limit of 30% is also based on Duﬃe/Lando(2001)), b Vt = Z0 and VB for all combination that resulted in rating grades
from AA to B. The case b Vt > Z0 and b Vt < Z0 was also analyzed, the results merely diﬀer from the case b Vt = Z0 and
are available upon request. Please note, that the result is continuous with respect to all input parameters. Therefore
a numerical approximation on a certain grid is feasible.
34The boundary is of course dependent on the required accuracy. The adjustment factor is higher if asset value
uncertainty is lower (cf. tables 7 and 8 in Appendix B). Even in the case of observable asset values, the adjustment
factor is on average smaller or equal to 1.12. For likely parameter combinations, the error is smaller than 10% for
asset volatilities larger than 10% (cf. Appendix B).2 MODEL SETUP 13
default probability belongs to an investment grade rating (cf. ﬁgure 4). This can be explained by
looking at the impact of the parameters introduced in the Duﬃe/Lando framework: All of them
do eﬀect the actual default probability as well as the risk neutral default probability in the same
direction, e.g. increasing the information uncertainty increases the actual as well as the risk neutral
default probability. The Sharpe ratio is the only parameter that solely has an eﬀect on the actual
default probability. This explains qualitatively, why the adjustment factor is close to one in most
cases. Second, the adjustment factor can be accurately determined simply based on knowledge of
the class-1-parameters and the actual default probability as long as σ > 10%. For any given com-
bination of default probability and maturity, parameters that cannot be observed easily (e.g. asset
volatility, default barrier, asset value or accounting noise) do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the adjustment
factor.
Please note the special role of the actual default probability: For example, an adjustment fac-
tor of appr. 1.7 (i.e. signiﬁcantly above 1) occurs for an asset value of Vt = 108, default barrier
L = 100, σ = 10%, T = 5, SR = 40% and α = 0%. If this were due to any class-2-parameter,
empirical applications would be hardly possible due to calibration errors of class-2-parameters.
But as soon as we change any of these parameters so that the resulting actual default probability
belongs to an investment grade rating (e.g. increasing Vt, decreasing α, decreasing σ (up to a
level of 10%)), the adjustment factor will be close to 1. Any combination of these parameters that
yields a given actual default probability also yields (almost) the same adjustment factor. All in all,
class-2-parameters may have an inﬂuence on the adjustment factor. This inﬂuence can, however,
(almost fully) be captured by the rating smile.
If we examine the inﬂuence of certain parameters in more detail, we can observe the following:
First, the adjustment factor decreases with increasing asset value uncertainty (α). This means,
that the Merton estimator overestimates the Sharpe ratio for high asset value uncertainty. I.e., a
higher asset value level uncertainty increases the risk neutral default probability. The eﬀect is quite
interesting: All other parameters being equal, a high risk neutral default probability can either be
explained by a higher risk aversion or by a higher asset value uncertainty. The eﬀect is more pro-
nounced for higher rating grades. We think, this could explain at least part of the perceived high
credit spreads for high rated obligors.35 This dependency on the asset value uncertainty is due to
the diﬀerence between the asset value estimation in t under the risk neutral compared to the real
world probability measure. Given unbiased information, the asset value in t under the risk neutral
probability measure equals the asset value under the real world probability measure. Assume now,
that we only have information about the asset value in t = 0 and we have observed, that no default
has occured up to t. In this scenario, the best estimate of the asset value in t will be lower under the
risk neutral probability measure due to the lower drift of the assets in the risk neutral world. This
lower asset value will result in a higher risk neutral default probability estimate from t to T. The
higher the noise in the information about the asset value in t, the more will the information about
survival inﬂuence our estimate of the asset value. Second, the parameter combinations leading to
the minimal and maximal adjustment factor in ﬁgure 4 belong to ’unlikely’ parameter combina-
tions. Table 7 in the Appendix shows the dependeny of the adjustment factor for a maturity of 5
35E.g. Huang/Huang (2005) show, that only appr. 20% of the spread for high rated obligors can be explained
by traditional asset value models compared to up to 100% for lower rated obligors. Cf. also Hull et.al (2005) for a
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years and a Baa-rating36 for α = 0% and s = 0, e.g. for the extreme of observable asset values,
table 8 for α = 30% and s = 3 representing large uncertainty about the asset value. The absolut
maximum is reached for small asset volatilites, no uncertainty and a high risk neutral asset growth
rate (i.e. a low payout rate). One would expect small asset volatilities to be linked with ’value
ﬁrms’ whereas low payout rates usually apply to ’growth companies’. The absolut minimum is
reached for small asset volatilities and high payout rates (i.e. a low risk neutral asset growth rate
m), which would suit the usual assumptions about value ﬁrms, but for a high uncertainty about
the current asset value, which one would usually assume for growth companies. Depicting values
which one would usually assume for value ﬁrms and growth ﬁrms, we can see that the adjustment
factor will be even closer around the mean value.
Third, the (average) adjustment factor increases with decreasing credit quality. This also simply
states that the classical Merton model overestimates risk neutral default probabilities for low rated
obligors. Therefore, the adjustment factor is larger than one. This again has the eﬀect, that if sim-
ple models like the Merton model are applied, the spread diﬀerence between high quality obligors
and low quality obligors will seem to be too low.
Figure 4: Adjustment factor in the Duﬃe/Lando model for diﬀerent rating grades. The minimum
and maximum is taken over the parameters 10% ≤ σ ≤ 30%, 0 ≤ α ≤ 30%, 0 ≤ m ≤ 5%,
10% ≤ SRV ≤ 40%, 0 ≤ s ≤ 3. Other parameter: T=5.
All in all, we have shown in this subsection, that the simple Merton estimator for the Sharpe
ratio is still valid in the Duﬃe/Lando (2001) framework for investment grade entities as long as the
asset volatility is larger than 10%. Investment grade bonds/CDS constitute the majority of traded
bond/CDS volume. Asset volatilities smaller than 10% usually only occur for ﬁnancial services
companies - cf. subsection 2.2 - so this is just a minor restriction.
36We choose this as an example, since 5-year CDS are the most liquid ones usually used in empirical studies, cf. for
example Berndt et.al. (2005) and Amato (2005) and Baa is the most common rating among non-ﬁnancial companies.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 15
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data sources and descriptive statistics
Our data sample consists of 125 North American companies based on the Dow Jones CDX.NA.IG-
index, which is an investment grade CDS index published by markit and a consortium of 16 in-
vestment banks.37 We used 5-year CDS spreads to derive risk neutral default probabilities. EDFs
(expected default probabilities) from Moody’s KMV data base were used as a proxy for the actual
default probabilities and correlations with the S&P500-index as a proxy for the correlations with
the market portfolio. In some occasions, Moody’s ratings were used in addition for the actual
default probability. All data was taken from the period from January 2003 until June 2007.
Credit Default Swaps are OTC credit derivatives that have become widely popular over the last
years with growth rates of over 100% (nominal value) in 2005 and 200638. Their main mechanism is
quite simple: The protection buyer periodically pays a predeﬁned premium (usually quarterly) to
the protection seller. In case of a credit event, the protection seller has to cover the losses incurred
on a predeﬁned reference obligation, i.e. he he has to pay an amount equal to the diﬀerence between
the nominal and the current market value of the predeﬁned reference obligation to the protection
buyer. As usual, put into practice, things turn out to be more complicated: The credit event has
to be precisely deﬁned, a basket of reference obligations has to be speciﬁed39 and the term ’market
value’ at the time of default has to be clearly speciﬁed. As in most academic research, we will
assume, that the extent of these speciﬁcation does not have a signiﬁcant value and therefore CDS
can be prized as if these implicit options were not part of the game.40
The 5-year CDS spreads (bid/ask/mid) used in our analysis were taken from Datastream. Only
dates with at least one trade for the respective CDS were used to avoid potential errors from pure
market maker data. We used CDS mid spreads for our analysis. Bid/ask-spreads served for con-
sistency checks and sensitivity analysis. The risk neutral default intensity λQ was derived by the
approximation s = λQ · LGDQ out of the CDS spread s and the risk neutral LGD41. A recovery
rate of 50% was used.42
37The data is based on the CDX.NA.IG.8-index. By ﬁrst ﬁxing the constituents list and then analyzing historical
data of these constituents, our data may be subject to a selection bias, since all these companies have performed well
enough to be included in an investment grade index. We are however not interested in the performance of the index
or any of its constituents but only examine risk pricing based on risk neutral and actual default probabilities.
38Total outstanding market volume was $26 trillion at the end of 2006 concerning to the ISDA, growth rates in
2005 and 2006 were 103% and 101% respectively (cf. ISDA 2006 year-end market survey).
39Deﬁning only a single reference obligation is not possible for practical reasons, which usually leads to a ’cheapest-
to-deliver’ option for the protection buyer, who can normally choose which reference obligation to sell to the protection
seller in case of a default.
40Cf. Berndt et.al. (2005) for example.
41The simple equation s = λQ · LGD
Q is only valid if the LGD is given as a fraction of market value. In case of a
recovery/loss given as a percentage of face value - as it will usually be the case when using rating agency data - default
intensity and recovery enter the pricing formula asymmetrically. For practical pruposes, the diﬀerences are minimal.
Cf. Duﬃe/Lando (1999) and Duﬃe/Lando (2003) for discussion. Cf. also Duﬃe/Singleton (2003) or Sch¨ onbucher
(2003).
42Based on Moody’s (2007) the average default rate from 1982-2006 was 38% (value-weighted basis) and 46% (same
weight for all years) respectively for senior unsecured bonds. The interquartile range based on yearly averages from
1982-2006 is 39%-54% on a 1-year basis and 43% to 51% on a 5-year basis. Other studies also derive recovery rates
of approximately 50%, e.g. Altman/Kishore (1996) (48%) and Carty/Liebermann (1996) (54%). As we are mainly
interested in an upper limit for the Sharpe ratio estimation, we choose a recovery rate of 50%, therefore slightly above3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 16
Variable N Mean Median Coeﬀ of Variation 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
CDS mid in bp 19945 51.2 41.77 74.74 28.1 62.5
CDS oﬀer in bp 19945 53.1 43.63 72.73 30.0 64.0
CDS bid in bp 19945 49.4 40 76.96 26.3 60.5
∆(oﬀer, bid) in bp 19945 3.8 3.62 54.22 2.7 4.7
Asset Vol. 19945 15% 15% 38.07 11% 18%
EDF1 19945 0.2% 0.1% 174.12 0.05% 0.15%
EDF5 19945 1.93% 1.38% 95.45 1.00% 2.15%
Moody’s PD1 14743 0.15% 0.10% 120.22 0.05% 0.18%
Moody’s PD5 14743 2.01% 1.63% 75.12 0.93% 2.51%
∆(EDF1, Moody’s PD1) 14743 0.00% -0.01% 11660.05 -0.11% 0.06%
Correlation 19945 0.51 0.52 24.53 0.42 0.60
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for main input parameters. EDF1/EDF5/Moody’s PD1/Moody’s
PD5 denote the respective 1- and 5-year cumulative default probabilities.
Expected default frequencies (EDFs) from Moody’s KMV data base were used as a proxy for
the actual default probabilities. EDFs are default probabilities, which are based on a Merton-style
structural framework.43 The calibration is, however, done more pragmatically based on a large set
of historical data and on discriminant analysis. EDFs are widely used in the banking industry and
also constitute a part of some of the internal rating systems of large banks. We used 1-year EDFs
and derived multi-year EDFs by Moody’s cumulative default probabilites per rating grade.44 The
main advantage of EDFs compared to other ratings for our purpose is its link to market data: The
current asset volatility and equity value are direct input parameters, therefore EDFs constitute
a ’point-in-time’ estimation of the current default probability. In contrast to EDFs, the ratings
of the large rating agencies are normally deﬁned as ’through-the-cycle’-ratings, which - in eﬀect -
results in diﬀerent default probabilities for a speciﬁc rating grade dependent on the current overall
economic outlook. In some circumstances, Moody’s ratings were used, if so, they were taken from
Bloomberg. The ratings were mapped to default probabilities via a logarithmic approach based on
raw data from Moody’s (2007), i.e. ln(PD) = β1 + β2 ∗ NRG, where NRG denotes the numerical
rating grade ranging from 1 (Aaa) to 16 (Baa3).45
Finally, we used 3-year weeekly46 correlations of the reference entities share price returns with
the S&P-500 index. The share prices were taken from Datastream. Companies without a NYSE
or NASDAQ listing were removed from the sample. A ﬂoor of 20% was applied to the estimation
of correlations.
Our ﬁnal data set consists of 19,945 date/company-combinations for which CDS spreads, EDFs
and correlations were available. Table 2 gives an overview of these main input parameters.
the average indicated by the studies cited above. Lower recovery rates result in lower risk neutral default probabilities
and therefore in lower Sharpe ratio estimates.
43Cf. for example Moody’s KMV (2007).
44Cf. Appendix D for details.
45The log-approach is a common approach for the calibration of default probabilities (cf. for example Bluhm et.al
(2003)). The resulting table of cumulative default probabilities can be found in Appendix D.
46The calibration of correlations has a minor eﬀect on the overall result, using 2-year or 1-year correlation did not
alter results signiﬁcantly.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 17
Variable N Mean Median Coeﬀ of Variation 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
λQ/λP (EDF) 19945 3.38 2.74 71.36 1.87 4.12
λQ/λP (Moody’s) 14743 3.40 2.55 87.09 1.70 4.03
Sharpe ratio market (EDF) 19945 42.46% 37.23% 76.33 21.91% 56.80%
Sharpe ratio company (EDF) 19945 19.56% 19.04% 60.32 11.76% 26.71%
Sharpe ratio market (Moody’s) 14743 39.01% 35.25% 75.70 21.50% 53.03%
Sharpe ratio company (Moody’s) 14743 18.70% 17.79% 67.63 10.15% 26.51%
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for main output parameters. (EDF) and (Moody’s) denotes, that
the respective parameter was calculated via EDFs and default probabilities derived from Moody’s
respectively. SR: Sharpe ratio. λQ and λP denote the actual/risk neutral default intensities.
3.2 Empirical ﬁndings and discussion
Based on the data described in subsection 3.1 and the Merton estimator for the Sharpe ratio derived
in section 3.1, we estimate the implicit company and market Sharpe ratios for each of the 19,945
observations.
3.2.1 Results of Sharpe ratio estimation
Our estimation yields an average market Sharpe ratio of 42%, with an average company Sharpe
ratio of 20% and an average correlation of 0.51 (cf. table 3). The median market Sharpe ratio is
37%. Half of the observations result in a company Sharpe ratio between 12% and 27% (market
Sharpe ratio: 22% and 57%).47 Using actual default probabilities from Moody’s leads to similar,
though slightly smaller estimates for the average company Sharpe ratio (19%) and market Sharpe
ratio (39%). Figure 5 shows, that the implicit market Sharpe ratio ﬂuctuates in a range between
30% and 50% over the period 2003 to 2007 with peaks in mid 2005 (downgrades of Ford and General
Motors) and mid 2007 (subprime crises). The volatility of the market Sharpe ratio is appr. 50%.
The disaggregation with respect to sectors shows a quite homogenous result. Seven out of eight
sectors have average implicit market Sharpe ratios between 30% and 45% as can be seen in table
4 The only outlier is the consumer stable sector with an average implicit market Sharpe ratio of
67%. This is due to a lower correlation of this sector with the market portfolio. Other studies
have pointed out the fact that correlations are not stable over time and seem to increase in adverse
market environments.48 Such adverse market environments are especially important when looking
at credit valuations, since only the tails of the distribution matter in this case. This may explain the
high implicit Sharpe ratios estimated for this sector. The lower Sharpe ratio estimates for ﬁnancial
services companies may be explained by their low asset volatility. The average asset volatility of
a ﬁnancial service company based on Moody’s KMv data is 8.8%. The ﬁnancial services sector is
the only sector which has an asset volatility smaller than 10%. Asset volatilites below 10% imply
higher adjustment factors (cf. section 2.3), i.e. the Merton estimator underestimates the true
Sharpe ratio.
47This interquartile range may seem large at ﬁrst. We do though want to point out, that our estimation was
conducted on a single-obligor/single-date level. We are not aware of any authors, that have reported the results for
dividend/earnings-discount models on this level, usually only aggregated data is provided. Based on own calculations,
we would though expect these estimations to have at least equal variations.
48Cf. for example Gersbach/Lipponer (2003).3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 18
Figure 5: Implicit Sharpe ratio based on CDS spreads and EDFs as a function of time.
Some studies have used the ratio of risk neutral to actual default probabilities (’Q-to-P-ratio’)
as a measure for risk aversion of investors.49 We would like to point out a major diﬀerence of
the Q-to-P-ratio compared to our Sharpe ratio estimator. Whereas the Sharpe ratio over the time
period under consideration has only slightly increased, the increase in the Q-to-P-ratio was much
stronger (cf. ﬁgure 6). This is a direct eﬀect of the increasing credit quality in the sample period
(cf. section 2.3). From a theoretical point of view, the Sharpe ratio seems to be a much better
indicator for risk aversion.
3.2.2 Portion of CDS spread attributable to credit risk
Some authors have argued, that especially for higher rating grades a signiﬁcant part of the credit
spread is not due to credit risk.50 Therefore we have analyzed our Sharpe ratio estimates sepa-
rately for each rating grade. In theory, it should be independent of the credit quality. Based on
the adjustment factors derived in section 2.3 slight variations may,, however be plausible. Table 5
compares the minimum and maximum of plausible Sharpe ratio estimates based on the adjustment
factors derived in section 2.3 to our actual estimates. We can indeed see that our Sharpe ratio
estimates for higher rating grades seem to be too high compared to the estimates for lower rating
grades. In fact, testing the null-hypothesis that the mean Sharpe ratio for the high rating grades
Aa and A equals the mean Sharpe ratio for the rating grade Baa results in p-values below 1%, e.g.
49Cf. for example Berndt et.al. (2005), Amato (2005) and Hull et.al. (2005).
50Cf. Huang/Huang (2005) and Liu et.al. (2007).3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 19
Sector N (d/c) N (c) SR company (EDF) Correlation SR market (EDF)
Communications and Technology 2,401 13 20.92%** 0.53 44.61%
Consumer Cyclical 4,653 25 20.72%** 0.51 43.71%*
Consumer Stable 2,291 14 23.15%** 0.40 67.33%**
Energy 1,340 6 17.50%** 0.43 42.95%
Financial 3,358 18 16.32%** 0.54 33.21%**
Industrial 2,659 14 19.20% 0.56 36.17%**
Materials 1,947 9 22.91%** 0.59 40.23%**
Utilities 1,296 6 12.75%** 0.45 29.76%**
Average 19,945 105 19.56% 0.51 42.46%
Table 4: Sharpe ratio estimator for diﬀerent industry sectors. N (d/c): Number of company/date
combinations available for this sector; N (c): Number of companies in this sector with at least
one observation. */** denotes that the diﬀerence to the total average is signiﬁcant at the 5%/1%
conﬁdence level.















Aa 17.57% 23.45% 26.35% 35.18% 28.90%**
A 16.83% 23.30% 25.25% 34.95% 22.98%**
Baa 15.77% 23.03% 23.65% 34.55% 17.97%
Ba 14.18% 22.43% 21.27% 33.64%
B 11.63% 20.21% 17.44% 30.32%
Table 5: Company Sharpe ratio estimator for diﬀerent rating grades. Merton estimator min/max:
Minimum/Maximum model-based Merton estimator after adjusting for the adjustment factors de-
rived in subsection 2.3 if the company Sharpe ratio is 20%/30%. AF: adjustment factor, SR:
company Sharpe ratio. P-Value: H0 : mean Sharpe ratio for the rating grades Aa and A equals
the mean Sharpe ratio of the rating grade Baa (17.97%). */** denotes that the diﬀerence to the
average Sharpe ratio in rating grade Baa (e.g. 17.97%) is signiﬁcant at the 5%/1% conﬁdence level.
the diﬀerence is largely signiﬁcant.51
If we look at a hypothetical change in the CDS spreads, that would make it a ’fair’ game - e.g. that
would yield the same Sharpe ratio for a all rating grades - we ﬁnd that the spread of an Aa-rated
obligor has to decline by appr. 50% to yield the same Sharpe ratio than for an average Baa-rated
obligor. Given an average spread of 32 bp for an Aa-rated obligor, this means a reduction of 16
bp. We do however have to point out, that less than 1% of all obligors are rated Aa in our sample
which could be a source of inaccuracy. The spread of an A-rated obligor has to decline by appr.
30% to yield the same Sharpe ratio than for an average Baa-rated obligor. Given an average spread
of 37 bp for an A-rated obligor, this implies a reduction of 12 bp. Alternatively, the spread of an
A-rated obligor has to increase by 20% or 7 bp to match the Sharpe ratio of an average Aa-rated
obligor. The spread of a Baa-rated obligor has to increase by appr. 50% (29 bp) or 20% (10 bp)
to yield the same Sharpe ratio than for an average Aa- or A-rated obligor.
Summing up, even in an unobservable asset value framework credit spreads for high quality com-
51We used a t-test and a nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank-sum test. Both resulted in p-values below 1%.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 20
Figure 6: Development of 5 year CDS spread, 1-year EDF, implicit market Sharpe ratio and Q-to-
P-ratio as a function of time.
panies still seem to be too high compared to credit spreads for lower quality companies.52 This
result is in line with other empirical research, which has stressed the role of taxes, transaction costs,
liquidity and other parameters absent in a perfect market setting.53 Although most of the research
focuses on bond pricing, an eﬀect on CDS spreads seems to be be likely as well based on arbitrage
arguments. It is not the scope of this paper to quantitatively evaluate these eﬀects. We do only
want to stress, that all these eﬀects will lead to a decrease in the implicit Sharpe ratio, since they
result in a declining portion of the CDS spread attributable to credit risk.54 Therefore the derived
market Sharpe ratio of 42% (mean) and 37% (median) is still valid as an upper limit on the market
Sharpe ratio in these settings.
52One could argue, that higher quality companies have less idiosyncratic risk than low quality companies, which
could justify the observed diﬀerences in Sharpe ratio estimations. The behavior of the correlation with respect to
rating classes is quite akward in this sample. The correlation is a increasing function of the EDF-measure and a
decreasing function of the default probability derived from Moody’s rating. Companies with a high correlation with
the market seem to have predominantly high Moody’s ratings and high EDFs, whereas the opposite seems to be true
for companies with a low correlation. We do not aim to resolve this conﬂict in this paper and leave this question for
further analysis.
53Cf. Huang/Huang (2005) and Liu et.al. (2007).
54The tax rate plays a special role, since - in contrast to other eﬀects - it does not only have an inﬂuence on the
portion of the credit spread attributable to credit risk but can also have an eﬀect on the volatility as it may in theory
- dependent on the tax system - decrease the volatility of the after tax cash ﬂow. It is however hardly imaginable that
CDS spreads will increase, if taxes are lowered. Therefore the general statements will - under realistic assumptions
- hold true for tax eﬀects, too. For a detailed discussion on the eﬀect of capital income taxes on asset prices cf. for
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3.2.3 Adjustment for tax eﬀects
In the next step, we have adjusted our estimator for the diﬀerent tax treatment on equity and
debt markets. Looking at equity returns, the capital gains should usually be tax free and only
the dividend part of the return is reduced by tax payments. In contrast, capital gains do - on
average - not pose a signiﬁcant part of credit returns, as bonds are normally issued at par. The
interest received on the bonds is normally subject to full tax payments. Since CDS are often
held by banks, we have applied a diﬀerent method to extract the tax eﬀect out of CDS spreads:55
Thinking in a P&L logic (and ignoring operative expenses), the diﬀerence between the CDS spread
(income) and the expected loss (as expected payout rate to the protection buyer) is - on average
- taxable on corporate level. Therefore, the after tax cash ﬂow received by an investor equals
(CDS spread − expected loss) · (1 − corporate tax rate). Using a corporate tax rate of 35%
yields an average company Sharpe ratio of 15% and a market Sharpe ratio of 32%.
3.2.4 Sensitivity with respect to noise in input parameters
In section 2, we have shown, that the results are quite robust to model changes. Besides misspec-
ifying the model, noise in the input parameters pose another possible source of inaccuracy. We
therefore tested the sensitivity of our results with respect to the main input parameters. The results
are shown in table 6. Changes of 10% relative to its original value result in a market Sharpe ratio of
appr. 5% higher/lower for all analyzed parameters (EDF: actual default probability, CDS spread,
recovery rate, correlations). We would like to focus on two parameters: First, the sensitivity with
respect to the CDS spread and second, the sensitivity with respect to the recovery rate.
The sensitivity with respect to the CDS spread can be used, if there is evidence that only a
portion of the CDS spread is attributable to credit risk. For example, if only 90% of the CDS mid
spread were attributable to credit risk, this would decrease our estimation for the market Sharpe
ratio by 4.6% (from 42.5% to 37.9%). In particular extracting the part due to liquidity risk may
increase the accuracy of our estimation.
We expect the recovery rate modelling to be another focus of further research. Based on Moody’s
(2007), the recovery rate volatility is signiﬁcantly smaller than the default rate volatility, with a
coeﬃcient of variation of appr. 25% on a 1-year basis compared to a appr. 60% for the default
probability. The interquartile range is 39%-54% on a 1-year basis and 43%-51% on a 5-year ba-
sis. Research on the recovery rates has soared over the last years, indicating, that recovery rates
vary by industry sector and through the business cycle. E.g., Moody’s (2007) indicates a signif-
icant negative correlation between realized recovery rate and realized default rate. It remains to
be shown, if this relationship holds true for expected values as well. Diﬀerent recovery rates for
speciﬁc sectors/companies may also explain some of the diﬀerences between the implicit Sharpe
ratios measured.
55An analysis of the inﬂuence of personal taxes on bond spreads can be found in Liu et.al. (2007).4 CONCLUSION 22
Company Sharpe ratio Market Sharpe ratio Market Sharpe ratio (at)
Base Case 19.56% 42.46% 32.13%
CDS spread -10% 17.40% 37.90% 28.56%
CDS spread +10% 21.55% 46.66% 35.46%
RR +10% 21.76% 47.11% 35.81%
RR -10% 17.60% 38.33% 28.89%
EDF -10% 21.44% 46.41% 35.32%
EDF +10% 17.83% 38.84% 29.25%
Correlation +10% 19.56% 38.60% 29.21%
Correlation -10% 19.56% 47.18% 35.70%
Table 6: Sensitivities of Sharpe ratio estimation for the main input parameters. Sharpe ratio
market (at) denotes the estimation for the market Sharpe ratio after tax adjustment. RR: recovery
rate, EDF: expected default frequency.
3.2.5 Comparison to other equity premium estimates
These ﬁndings strongly support current research on the equity premium, which has averaged appr.
7-9% over the last 50 years.56 This is equivalent to a Sharpe ratio of appr. 40-50%. Current
research suggests, that the development of stock markets over the last 50 years was partially driven
by extraordinary gains and cannot be explained by fundamentals alone.57 A ’fair’ equity premium
is seen at appr. 3-5% in most academic research, equivalent to a Sharpe ratio of appr. 15%-30%58.
Taking our Sharpe ratio estimate of 42% and 32% (after tax adjustment) and taking into account,
that only part of the total credit spread is attributable to credit risk yields the same qualitative
result: Sharpe ratios of above 40% simply do not seem to be priced in current asset values.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new framework for estimating the equity premium. We measure
the risk attitude of investors based on credit valuations and transforms it to an equity premium via
structural models. This approach oﬀers a new line of thought for estimating the equity premium
that is not directly linked to current methods. In addition, our approach is suited to link the cur-
rent literature about credit risk premia on the one hand and the equity premium on the other hand.
First, we have theoretically analyzed the estimation of Sharpe ratios out of credit valuations based
on a simple Merton model and a more advanced structural model of default by Duﬃe/Lando (2001)
including unobservable asset values. Based on the Merton model, we have developed a simple es-
timator for the market Sharpe ratio. This estimator only uses actual and risk neutral default
probabilities, the maturity and equity correlations. We do neither have to calibrate a structural
model nor do we have to estimate earnings or dividend growth. The theoretical results show an
astonishing robustness of this simple estimator with respect to model changes. Although actual and
56Cf. for historical equity premia Ibbotson (2006) and for an overview and discussion Fama/French (2002),
Claus/Thomas (2002) and Illmanen (2002).
57Among others, Fama/French (2001) derive an implicit Sharpe ratio for the U.S.-market from 1951-2000 of 15%
based on the dividend growth model and a Sharpe ratio of 25% based on the earnings growth model. Claus/Thomas
(2001) derive an equity premium of 3.4% based on an Earnings forecast model, which equals a Sharpe ratio of appr.
17%-23% (based on a market volatility of 15%-20%).
58Implying an average market volatility of 15%-20%.4 CONCLUSION 23
risk neutral default probabilities are largely aﬀected by model changes, the Merton estimator for
the Sharpe ratio is merely inﬂuenced for investment grade companies with an asset volatility above
10%. Asset volatilities above 10% can reasonably be assumed for all non-ﬁnancial services compa-
nies. This robustness is due to the following eﬀect: The Sharpe ratio is the only parameter in these
models that only has an eﬀect on the actual default probability. All other parameters/mechanisms
have an inﬂuence in the same direction on both actual and risk neutral default probabilities, but
they merely have an inﬂuence on the relation between actual and risk neutral default probabilities.
An empirical analysis of 125 companies from a North Americal investement grade CDS index
(CDS.NA.IG) has shown, that the average market Sharpe ratio derived from the Merton estima-
tor equals 42%, a simple tax adjustment results in a market Sharpe ratio of 32%. Accounting in
addition for the fact, that some portion of the credit spread does not seem to be attributable to
credit risk, implicit Sharpe ratios of more than 30% do not seem to be plausible. These ﬁndings
strongly conﬁrm analysis on the equity premium, which have shown that equity prices imply market
Sharpe ratios of 15-30%59, far below the average realized Sharpe ratios in the second half of the
20th century of 40-50%.60
We see three main areas for further research: First, a more accurate determination of the part
of the CDS spread attributable to credit risk seems to be very important. This, together with a
more thorough treatment of the tax diﬀerences on equity and debt markets could help to improve
the accuracy of the overall level of our implicit Sharpe ratio estimation. Third, empirical analysis
has shown, that the assumption of constant recovery rates is suboptimal. In reality, recovery rates
diﬀer by sectors and vary through time. A more accurate estimation of the expected risk neu-
tral recovery rate could help to more accurately determine the implicit Sharpe ratio for individual
sectors and over time.
59Equivalent to an equity premium of appr. 3-5% and an equity volatility of 15-20%.
60Equivalent to an equity premium of appr. 7-9% and an equity volatiliy of 15-20% (cf. Fama/French (2002) and
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A Correlation between asset and equity returns
In this Appendix, we will show that the correlation between asset returns and market returns in
the Merton framework as well as in the Duﬃe/Lando framework61 is approximately equal to the
correlation between equity returns and market returns. Since covariance matrices are always positiv
semideﬁnit, it is suﬃcient to show, that the correlation between asset returns and equity returns
is approximately one.62 The economic reason for a correlation of one between asset and equity
values is quite simple: As equity is modeled in both frameworks as a deep-in-the-the-money63 call
option on the companies assets64, the sensitivity of the option with respect to the asset value is
almost linear (i.e. the delta of the option is almost one and therefore gamma is close to zero).
A correlation of 1 is equivalent to a positive linear relationship, so as the relationship is almost
linear, the correlation will be approximately one. The correlation will be the smaller, the less linear
the relationship is, i.e. the higher the default probability (and therefore the less in-the-money the
option) and/or the higher the eﬀect of other input parameters that lead to non-linearities with
respect to the asset value (e.g. taxes, insolvency costs in the Duﬃe/Lando framework).
Qualitatively, the correlation will be highest for high credit quality companies in the Merton frame-
work and lowest for low credit quality companies in the Duﬃe/Lando framework. Quantitavely, the
correlation will always be above 99% for investment grade companies and above 97% for companies
with a rating of at least B in both frameworks, as we will show in the following subsections.
A.1 Correlation between asset and equity values in the Merton framework
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61Which is, concerning the relationship between asset and equity value, basically the same as the Leland/Toft
(1996) model.
62Since the covariance matrix is positv semideﬁnit, it has a non-negative determinant. The determinant of the


















2 ≥ 0 and therefore ρ1,3 = ρ2,3. We have also directly simulated the diﬀerence between the correlation
between equity and market values and asset and market values. The results conﬁrm the analysis in this Appendix.
63Of course, this option is not by deﬁnition deep-in-the-money but rather depends on the ’closeness’ of the asset
value to the default barrier. Looking at investment grade ratings, the maximum one-year default probability is
approximately 0.4%, even extending the rating grades up to single B rating results in a one-year default probability
of not more than 10%. So we look at options, that are executed with an (acutal) probability of at least 99.6%
(investment grade) and 90% (single B) respectively. This motivates the use of the term ’deep-in-the-money’.
64The sort of option is of course diﬀerent in both frameworks: a plain vanilla, european, call option in the Merton
framework and a knock-out option in the Duﬃe/Lando framework.A CORRELATION BETWEEN ASSET AND EQUITY RETURNS 25
There is no analytical solution. Therefore we have to draw back on numerical approximations.
The calcuation is straightforward, the result can be found in ﬁgure 7. Note, that each rating grade
is identiﬁed by a speciﬁc cumulative default probability based on Moody’s (2007). Therefore, in
the ﬁrst step, combinations of the parameters (e.g. asset volatility, asset value) were depicted,
that lead to the same cumulative default probability.65 In the next step, the correlations for
these parameter combinations were numerically evaluated and the minimum and mean was plottet
in ﬁgure 7. Plotting correlations (and other parameters) with respect to the rating grade in a
structural model may seem odd at ﬁrst, but given the information available to a common investor
(i.e. the rating), this is the only reasonable way. In addition, the rating grade is a very convenient
way of clustering the results, since correlations are very similar within a rating grade, e.g. a ’high’
volatility combined with ’high’ current asset value leads to a similar rating and a similar correlation
than a ’low’ volatility combined with a ’low’ current asset value.
Figure 7: Correlation between equity and asset value in the Merton framework. Parameter com-
binations for calculating the minimum/mean: σ : 3% − 30%, company Sharpe ratio: 10% − 40%,
other parameters: r = 6%, T (maturity) = 5, N = 100, Vt choosen to ﬁt target actual default
probability for respective rating grade.
A.2 Correlation between asset and equity values in the Duﬃe/Lando frame-
work
In this subsection, we will analyze the correlation between asset and equity values in the Duﬃe/Lando
framework. As a special case, this will also cover the correlation in the ﬁrst passage time frame-
work with observable asset values. The procedure is basically the same as in the Merton framework
though the determination of a set of parameters leading to a speciﬁc default probability cannot be
65Precisely, this means that all parameters but the asset value were ﬁxed and the asset value was choosen as to
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analytically calculated but must be found by numerical techniques. The result is shown in ﬁgure
8. As discussed at the beginning of this Appendix, the correlations are slightly smaller than in the
Merton framework, but still above 99% for investment grade companies. Extending the analysis to
maturities smaller or larger than 5 years does not signiﬁcantly change the result. Further analysis
is available upon request.
All in all, asset values and equity values do always move in the same direction in the Duﬃe/Lando
framework, e.g. the equity value always rises with rising asset value, all other parameters being
equal. We do, however, want to point out, that there may be states, where asset and equity values
do not move in the same directions in reality, if we allow other parameters to be volatile. One
famous example is asset substitution (e.g. equity holders increase the volatility of the assets),
where the asset value stays constant66 and the equity value increases. Others may be the strategic
setting of the dividend/payout rate or a non-constant default barrier. It is not within the scope of
this paper to explicitly evaluate the eﬀect on the correlation between asset and equity value, we
do however not expect our results to materially diﬀer under these scenarios given the very high
correlations observed in our models. As an indication, one could use the correlation between asset
and equity value given in the KMV-model. For our data set, the correlation is on average 90%,
the median is 95%. The lower average is mainly due to a small set of companies with correlations
below 70%, which is usually due to large one-time eﬀect on the asset value and/or default point.
Figure 8: Correlation between equity and asset value in the Duﬃe/Lando framework. Parameter
combinations for calculating the minimum/mean: σ : 3%−30%, company Sharpe ratio: 10%−40%,
risk neutral asset growth rate after payouts: 0% − 5%, α (asset value uncertainty): 0% − 30%, T1
(time since last certain asset value information): 0y−3y, other parameters: r = 6%, T (maturity)=
5, default barrier=100, Vt choosen to ﬁt target actual default probability for respective rating grade.
66Or may even decline, if the rising asset volatility is bought by negative NPV assets.B DETAILS ABOUT ADJUSTMENT FACTORS 27
B Details about adjustment factors in the Duﬃe/Lando frame-
work
The following tables show adjustment factors for the Sharpe ratio estimation in the Duﬃe/Lando
framework for diﬀerent parameter combinations.
Adjustment factor σ
m Sharpe ratio 10% 15% 20% 30% Average
0% 0,1 1,04 1,04 1,04 1,04 1,04
0,2 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,04 1,05
0,3 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,05 1,06
0,4 1,08 1,07 1,07 1,06 1,07
Average (m=0%) 1,06 1,06 1,05 1,05 1,05
2,5% 0,1 1,08 1,06 1,05 1,04 1,06
0,2 1,10 1,07 1,06 1,05 1,07
0,3 1,12 1,09 1,08 1,06 1,09
0,4 1,14 1,11 1,09 1,07 1,10
Average (m=2.5%) 1,11 1,08 1,07 1,06 1,08
5% 0,1 1,15 1,09 1,07 1,05 1,09
0,2 1,18 1,11 1,08 1,06 1,11
0,3 1,22 1,14 1,10 1,07 1,13
0,4 1,27 1,17 1,13 1,09 1,16
Average (m=5%) 1,21 1,13 1,10 1,07 1,12
Average 1,12 1,09 1,07 1,06 1,09
Table 7: Adjustment factors for a rating of Baa and a maturity of 5 years for a scenario of observable asset values (i.e. s=0 and α = 0%).
Other parameters: m=asset growth rate = risk free rate - payout rate, σ=asset volatility, Sharpe ratio = Sharpe ratio of asset value process (before
payout rate). Bold numbers denote the Min/Max, itallic numbers denote typical value ﬁrms. Please note: Adjustment factors for credit qualities
higher than Baa are even lower.
Adjustment factor sigma
m Sharpe ratio 10% 15% 20% 30% Average
0% 0,1 0,87 0,90 0,93 0,97 0,92
0,2 0,88 0,91 0,93 0,97 0,92
0,3 0,89 0,92 0,94 0,98 0,93
0,4 0,91 0,93 0,96 0,99 0,95
Average (m=0%) 0,89 0,92 0,94 0,98 0,93
2,5% 0,1 0,91 0,92 0,94 0,97 0,93
0,2 0,93 0,93 0,95 0,98 0,95
0,3 0,96 0,95 0,97 0,99 0,97
0,4 0,99 0,98 0,99 1,00 0,99
Average (m=2.5%) 0,95 0,95 0,96 0,99 0,96
5% 0,1 0,99 0,95 0,96 0,98 0,97
0,2 1,03 0,98 0,98 0,99 0,99
0,3 1,08 1,01 1,00 1,01 1,02
0,4 1,13 1,04 1,02 1,02 1,06
Average (m=5%) 1,06 1,00 0,99 1,00 1,01
Average 0,96 0,95 0,96 0,99 0,97
Table 8: Adjustment factors for a rating of Baa and a maturity of 5 years for a scenario of highly unobservable asset values (i.e. s=3 and
α = 30%). Other parameters: m= risk neutral asset growth rate = risk free rate - payout rate, σ=asset volatility, Sharpe ratio = Sharpe ratio of
asset value process (before payout rate). Bold numbers denote the Min/Max, itallic numbers denote typical value ﬁrms.
C Details Sharpe ratio estimation
The following tables show the results of the Sharpe ratio estimation for each single company per
sector, cf. table 9 and 10. Please note: Moody’s ratings for ﬁnancial service companies are usually
not comparable with non-ﬁnancial services companies as the underlying default probabilities are
usually assumed to be diﬀerent, e.g. a A2-rating of a ﬁnancial services company has a lower default
probability than a A2-rating of a non-ﬁnancial services company. This explains the higher Moody’s













ALLTEL Corp 3.19 20.24% 33.15% 33.48% 54.53%
AT&T Inc 2.51 14.80% 28.33% 33.67% 63.11%
CenturyTel Inc 5.78 31.01% 67.26% 23.04% 49.18%
Comcast Cable Comms
LLC
7.23 37.24% 98.34% 14.37% 39.25%
Computer Sciences Corp 2.52 12.69% 30.04% 31.18% 66.78%
Hewlett Packard Co 1.09 -1.78% -1.65% 17.30% 29.64%
IAC InterActiveCorp 5.71 33.75% 56.18% 13.21% 21.97%
Intl Business Machs Corp 2.20 13.71% 21.71%
Omnicom Gp Inc 2.07 12.82% 26.16% 16.14% 29.19%
R R Donnelley & Sons Co 5.65 31.71% 92.62% 22.57% 64.88%
Sprint Nextel Corp 5.09 30.24% 70.35% 17.67% 36.91%
Time Warner Inc 3.77 19.81% 38.10% 26.58% 43.92%
Verizon Comms Inc 4.86 25.49% 48.14% 33.61% 62.26%
Communications and
Technology: Average
3.86 20.92% 44.61% 22.87% 44.94%
Consumer Cyclical Autozone Inc 4.77 28.55% 70.18%
Cardinal Health Inc 3.04 20.04% 65.31% 14.49% 37.65%
Caterpillar Inc 1.87 10.67% 16.42%
CBS Corp 5.09 29.74% 74.23% 31.07% 77.29%
Centex Corp 2.15 13.43% 24.00%
ConAgra Foods Inc 4.59 26.94% 77.89% 15.64% 41.33%
CVS Corp 2.91 17.32% 38.79% 19.11% 41.96%
Deere & Co 1.68 8.66% 13.72% 16.42% 26.33%
J C Penney Co Inc 5.09 30.73% 70.11% 2.48% 5.29%
Jones Apparel Gp Inc 8.66 36.39% 72.82% 21.86% 42.33%
Lennar Corp 3.13 22.58% 44.36% 12.29% 22.71%
Ltd Brands Inc 2.62 14.15% 28.58% 17.39% 33.36%
Marriott Intl Inc 5.53 30.64% 52.72% 14.59% 23.51%
McDonalds Corp 2.47 14.54% 30.27% 26.29% 52.27%
McKesson Corp 1.33 4.62% 12.82% 9.23% 25.64%
Nordstrom Inc 2.36 13.82% 27.16% 27.08% 51.60%
Pulte Homes Inc 2.27 16.19% 31.37% 17.08% 32.60%
Sherwin Williams Co 4.93 27.64% 64.64% 29.08% 72.99%
Southwest Airls Co 3.97 24.87% 50.33%
Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Wwide Inc
11.01 47.70% 88.14% 19.84% 36.59%
Target Corp 1.96 10.78% 21.13% 19.99% 37.49%
Toll Bros Inc 3.31 24.32% 46.27%
Wal Mart Stores Inc 2.54 15.57% 28.03%
Walt Disney Co 3.53 22.59% 36.54% 21.92% 34.58%
Whirlpool Corp 2.03 11.37% 19.85% 20.15% 36.18%
Consumer Cyclical: Aver-
age
3.71 20.72% 43.71% 17.60% 35.34%
Consumer Stable Altria Gp Inc 11.93 50.60% 186.98% 36.60% 140.35%
Amgen Inc. 3.80 22.56% 66.83% 23.71% 70.78%
Baxter Intl Inc 1.83 10.21% 35.72% 14.85% 52.87%
Boston Scientiﬁc Corp 2.98 19.55% 63.81% 8.70% 26.44%
Bristol Myers Squibb Co 1.94 10.56% 20.84% 31.86% 58.46%
Campbell Soup Co 3.27 20.24% 54.45% 17.68% 48.08%
Gen Mls Inc 6.50 33.79% 114.28% 20.60% 70.95%
Loews Corp 1.46 6.43% 10.38% 20.38% 34.48%
Safeway Inc 4.59 27.02% 56.96%
Sara Lee Corp 5.62 27.84% 78.13% 24.56% 68.80%
The Kroger Co. 5.10 29.73% 61.06% 10.39% 20.54%
Tyson Foods Inc 4.53 29.14% 107.64% 18.15% 62.82%
Unvl Health Svcs Inc 3.52 23.59% 90.10%
Wyeth 2.89 18.90% 49.51% 24.32% 59.24%
Consumer Stable: Average 4.20 23.15% 67.33% 20.33% 55.84%
Energy Anadarko Pete Corp 3.19 17.50% 45.29% 12.80% 31.50%
ConocoPhillips 2.71 16.53% 32.85% 21.60% 42.79%
Devon Engy Corp 2.87 18.70% 53.59% 10.33% 28.52%
Halliburton Co 2.35 14.86% 35.06% 17.78% 42.91%
Transocean Inc 2.68 15.32% 36.72% 12.42% 27.77%
Valero Energy Corp 3.22 21.88% 53.25% 9.62% 19.68%
Energy: Average 2.84 17.50% 42.95% 14.03% 32.10%











Financial ACE Ltd 2.29 14.49% 25.50% 28.65% 49.05%
Amern Express Co 2.77 17.52% 22.40%
Amern Intl Gp Inc 1.81 9.83% 16.74% 36.17% 70.81%
Boeing Cap Corp 2.00 12.67% 27.85% 23.31% 50.22%
Cap One Bk 2.22 14.02% 26.01% 17.44% 29.63%
Chubb Corp 2.33 12.70% 24.74% 32.68% 60.12%
Cigna Corp 2.35 11.87% 42.45% 9.00% 28.60%
Ctrywde Home Lns Inc 1.82 11.20% 27.43% 31.44% 77.24%
Gen Elec Cap Corp 1.59 6.23% 9.90%
Hartford Finl Svcs Gp Inc 1.64 8.90% 13.03% 21.88% 31.36%
Marsh & Mclennan Cos
Inc
4.49 26.35% 59.67% 22.16% 42.31%
MBIA Ins Corp 2.73 18.39% 30.27%
MetLife Inc 2.02 11.97% 22.60% 19.74% 37.20%
Radian Gp Inc 4.74 28.30% 54.33%
Simon Ppty Gp L P 4.46 24.76% 61.36%
WA Mut Inc 3.13 20.81% 38.73% 33.87% 57.39%
Wells Fargo & Co 4.18 24.44% 38.14% 8.00% 12.51%
XL Cap Ltd 2.22 14.62% 30.72% 34.82% 70.07%
Financial: Average 2.74 16.32% 33.21% 24.07% 47.22%
Industrial Arrow Electrs Inc 3.52 26.25% 40.49%
Burlington Nthn Santa Fe
Corp
3.90 23.52% 40.80% 9.00% 16.28%
Carnival Corp 4.74 27.91% 41.94% 26.96% 40.17%
CSX Corp 3.90 22.56% 40.00% 6.04% 9.78%
Goodrich Corp 1.92 12.57% 27.09% 9.90% 17.01%
Honeywell Intl Inc 1.63 7.73% 12.20%
Ingersoll Rand Co 2.70 16.70% 24.12%
Lockheed Martin Corp 3.20 20.67% 61.89% 3.02% 10.69%
Motorola Inc 1.56 7.72% 16.77% 11.15% 26.09%
Newell Rubbermaid Inc 3.18 20.86% 37.97% 19.63% 35.28%
Norfolk Sthn Corp 2.85 16.98% 34.32%
Northrop Grumman Corp 4.65 26.72% 68.59% 4.44% 11.80%
Raytheon Co 3.22 20.29% 41.62% 1.67% 3.53%
Un Pac Corp 5.89 31.61% 60.37% 10.36% 20.48%
Industrial Ergebnis 3.17 19.20% 36.17% 11.78% 21.94%
Materials Alcan Inc. 2.85 17.79% 29.69%
Dow Chem Co 3.26 21.21% 36.90% 18.72% 30.39%
Eastman Chem Co 3.36 22.87% 41.06% 17.92% 32.16%
Intl Paper Co 4.49 27.75% 43.28% 15.50% 23.36%
MeadWestvaco Corp 3.53 23.37% 39.51% 17.91% 29.47%
Olin Corp 2.55 18.04% 35.87%
Rohm & Haas Co 2.63 16.82% 27.16% 19.14% 30.84%
Temple Inland Inc 6.30 34.80% 74.46% 14.95% 31.75%
Weyerhaeuser Co 4.91 29.04% 50.15% 17.55% 29.29%
Materials: Average 3.62 22.91% 40.23% 17.49% 29.39%
Utilities Amern Elec Pwr Co Inc 2.61 16.90% 36.55% 3.53% 6.98%
Constellation Engy Gp Inc 2.05 11.76% 28.11% 18.47% 41.50%




Progress Engy Inc 2.22 14.50% 35.49%
Sempra Engy 1.82 9.67% 19.01% 18.20% 37.35%
Utilities: Average 2.21 12.75% 29.76% 15.51% 35.01%
Total: Average 3.38 19.56% 42.46% 18.70% 39.01%
Table 10: Details of Sharpe ratio estimation per sector and company. Please note: Moody’s ratings for ﬁnancial service companies are usually
not comparable with non-ﬁnancial services companies as the underlying default probabilities are usually assumed to be diﬀerent, e.g. a A2-rating
of a ﬁnancial services company has a lower default probability than a A2-rating of a non-ﬁnancial services company. This explains the higher
Moody’s Sharpe ratios for ﬁnancial services companies.D MAPPING OF MOODY’S RATING GRADES TO DEFAULT PROBABILITES 30
D Mapping of Moody’s rating grades to default probabilites
For the mapping of Moody’s rating grades to default probabilities, we used the raw data provided
by Moody’s (2007). We used a log-linear relationship to calibrate the default probabilities, i.e.
ln(PD) = β1 + β2 ∗ NRG,
where NRG denotes the numerical rating grade ranging from 1 (Aaa) to 16 (Baa3). This yielded
the following cumulative default probabilities per rating grade:
Rating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aaa 0.001 0.006 0.019 0.041 0.071 0.094 0.114 0.125 0.135 0.148
Aa1 0.002 0.011 0.032 0.065 0.108 0.143 0.173 0.190 0.205 0.224
Aa2 0.004 0.018 0.052 0.103 0.166 0.218 0.261 0.287 0.310 0.339
Aa3 0.007 0.032 0.085 0.163 0.255 0.331 0.394 0.434 0.470 0.512
A1 0.013 0.055 0.139 0.256 0.392 0.502 0.596 0.657 0.712 0.775
A2 0.024 0.095 0.228 0.404 0.601 0.763 0.900 0.995 1.078 1.173
A3 0.045 0.164 0.373 0.637 0.922 1.159 1.360 1.506 1.633 1.774
Baa1 0.083 0.285 0.611 1.004 1.416 1.760 2.056 2.278 2.475 2.683
Baa2 0.152 0.493 1.002 1.583 2.173 2.674 3.107 3.447 3.750 4.058
Baa3 0.279 0.855 1.642 2.496 3.335 4.063 4.695 5.217 5.681 6.139
Ba1 0.514 1.482 2.691 3.934 5.120 6.172 7.095 7.894 8.607 9.286
Ba2 0.946 2.569 4.411 6.202 7.858 9.376 10.722 11.946 13.041 14.046
Ba3 1.741 4.452 7.229 9.778 12.061 14.243 16.204 18.076 19.759 21.247
B1 3.204 7.716 11.847 15.414 18.512 21.638 24.488 27.354 29.936 32.139
B2 5.896 13.373 19.417 24.301 28.413 32.871 37.007 41.392 45.356 48.615
B3 10.850 23.178 31.823 38.310 43.611 49.936 55.926 62.635 68.719 73.538
Table 11: Cumulative default probabilities for Moody’s ratings in percent.REFERENCES 31
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